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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States is currently moving forward with a dramatic overhaul 
of its health care system as landmark legislation begins to take effect.1  Long 
defined by laissez–faire principles, U.S. health care became fraught with 
what many consider unsustainable costs,2 and thus became subject to 
unprecedented government intervention.  However, as decades of presidents 
and congressmen have learned,3 reforms that would abandon the market 
competition so essential to the existing system—reforms modeled after Great 
Britain or Japan, for example4—are political nonstarters in the U.S.5  
This longstanding tension between individualism and regulation is the 
context in which President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (the PPACA) into law in March 2010.6  An ambitious 
law that takes aim at virtually the system’s every nit, the PPACA broadly 
sought to reconcile small-government values—enjoying a popular 
renaissance at the time thanks to widespread government deficits7—with a 
social conscience disturbed by years of inequitable health care.8  
One issue that has permeated nearly all debates over U.S. health care 
reform is access. Health disparities among socioeconomic classes are 
strikingly high in the U.S. compared to most of the developed world.9  Thus, 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C. and 42 U.S.C.).  
 2 See MICHAEL TANNER, CATO POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 613, THE GRASS IS NOT ALWAYS 
GREENER: A LOOK AT NATIONAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS AROUND THE WORLD 2–3 (2008) 
(arguing that health care costs rising faster than GDP growth, along with rising debts of 
government health programs, threaten to burden the U.S. economy in perpetuity if 
unaddressed). 
 3 See David Pratt, Health Care Reform: Will it Succeed?, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 493, 
497–500 (2011) (summarizing past reform efforts).  
 4 TANNER, supra note 2, at 15–18, 23–25. 
 5 Pratt, supra note 3, at 498–99. 
 6 Id. at 495.  
 7 See Washington Post-ABC News Poll, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/polls/postpoll_011610.html?sid=ST2010011701314 (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) 
(polling Americans in January, 2010, 58% of which said they preferred smaller government 
with fewer services). 
 8 Barack Obama, Op-Ed, Why We Need Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/opinion/16obama.html (appealing directly to the public 
regarding health reform and focusing on those who could not afford insurance, were denied 
coverage because of medical histories, or were victims of other insurance practices such as high 
out-of-pocket expenses).  
 9 See Michael de Looper & Gaetan Lafortune, Measuring Disparities in Health Status and 
in Access and Use of Health Care in OECD Countries 25, 32 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation and 
Dev., OECD Health Working Paper No. 43, 2009), available at http://search.oecd.org/official 
documents/displaydocumentpdf/?doclanguage=en&coteDELSA/HEA/WD/HWP(2009)2 
(showing that the U.S. fares poorly in two key metrics: (1) odds of fair or poor health in lower  
socioeconomic groups compared to higher income groups and (2) health insurance coverage  
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policy considerations as to how health care should be provided to low- and 
middle-income classes, and who should pay for it, guided many of the 
reforms effectuated by the PPACA.10  Two particularly relevant, and 
controversial, elements of the Act are (1) the expansion of Medicaid, the 
existing state and federal government program for insuring the poor, and (2) 
the implementation of health insurance exchanges through which individuals 
can purchase private insurance.11  These provisions arose under the 
PPACA’s individual mandate, which requires all U.S. citizens to purchase 
health insurance or pay a penalty.12  The PPACA helps low-income 
individuals satisfy this requirement by expanding Medicaid to cover those 
with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level and admitting into the 
program childless adults, who were previously excluded.13  The Act helps 
others with the costs of the individual mandate by establishing state-based 
health insurance exchanges.14  These exchanges are intended to facilitate the 
purchase of private insurance by regulating the plans eligible to be sold 
therein and subsidizing certain plans based on the purchasers’ household 
incomes.15  
However, any federal law attempting to move mountains socially must 
act within the procedural limitations of U.S. federalism.  Extensive 
controversy and litigation followed the passage of the PPACA, most of 
which related to the federal government’s ability to impose the law on 
unwilling states.16  Among its many federally administered regulations, the 
original version of the law required states to expand their Medicaid programs 
or lose all federal support for Medicaid.17  After hearing an appeal from 
twenty-six states, the U.S. Supreme Court held in June 2012 that the 
PPACA’s mandatory Medicaid expansion constituted coercion toward the 
states and could not be upheld.18  The decision, National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, left the rest of the law intact but limited the 
federal government’s enforcement authority regarding the Medicaid 
                                                                                                                   
for a core set of services). 
 10 See Obama, supra note 8 (identifying the struggle of 46 million people to pay for health 
insurance as the primary issue targeted by the PPACA). 
 11 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C. and 42 U.S.C.).  
 12 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1, 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf (last updated Apr. 15, 2011) [hereinafter 
SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT].  
 13 Pratt, supra note 3, at 520.  
 14 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 18021–18063 (2010). 
 15 Pratt, supra note 3, at 515–16. 
 16 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 passim (U.S. 2012). 
 17 Id. at 2582. 
 18 Id. at 2604. 
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expansion.19  This effectively made such an expansion optional, with no 
threat to states’ existing Medicaid programs.20  
As a result, many state leaders have announced their intentions to decline 
the expansion.21  Furthermore, a majority of states opted not to establish their 
own health insurance exchanges by the deadline specified in the PPACA.22  
Such obstinacy, particularly with respect to the insurance exchanges, could 
be hugely problematic when considered in conjunction with the rest of the 
health law.  At a basic level, these states’ low-income citizens would only 
enjoy more equitable health coverage if federally administered health 
exchanges were able to fill the resultant coverage gap.23  If the federal 
exchanges fail to enroll the bulk of this population, it could have sweeping 
effects on the new insurance marketplace, which depends in various ways on 
widespread participation.24    
With so much uncertainty as to what form its health care system will 
eventually take, where can the U.S. look for guidance?  This Note posits that 
the U.S. should look to Switzerland, a once-popular analogue in debates over 
U.S. health care reform.25  Both as a model for implementing the new health 
                                                                                                                   
 19 Id. at 2607–08. 
 20 Id.  
 21 Brianna Ehley, GOP Govs Fight with Hospitals over Medicaid Opt-In, FISCAL TIMES 
(Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/08/20/GOP-Govs-Fight-with-H 
ospitals-over-Medicaid-Opt-In.aspx#page1.  
 22 Phil Galewitz, Facing Deadline, Most States Say No to Running Their Own Insurance 
Exchanges, KAISER HEALTH NEWS BLOG (Dec. 14, 2012, 9:51 AM), http://capsules.kaiserhealth 
news.org/index.php/2012/12/facing-deadline-most-states-say-no-to-running-their-own-insuranc 
e-exchanges.  Only eighteen states submitted proposals for state-run exchanges to the 
Department of Health and Human Services by the law’s December 14, 2012 deadline.  Id.  States 
choosing not to establish their own exchanges have shifted that responsibility to the federal 
government. Id. 
 23 CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., 
GENERAL GUIDANCE ON FEDERALLY-FACILITATED EXCHANGES 3 (2012), available at http:// 
www.cms.gov.CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/ffe-guidance-05-16-201 
2.pdf; see also Galewitz, supra note 22.  If states do not establish an exchange by January 1, 
2014, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services will be expected to have 
set up a federally administered exchange that will serve that state’s citizens.  Most analysts did 
not expect a majority of states to defer this process to the federal government, a reality that 
has raised questions about the federal government’s capacity to establish exchanges for so 
many people.  Id. 
 24 See Rachel Kreier & Peter Zweifel, Health Insurance in Switzerland: A Closer Look at a 
System Often Offered as a Model for the United States, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 93 (2011); see 
also Paul J. Donahue, Federalism and the Financing of Health Care in Canada and 
Switzerland: Lessons for Health Care Reform in the United States, 21 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 385, 424–25 (1998).  
 25 See generally Donahue, supra note 24 (considering the Swiss system as a possible model 
for U.S. reforms well before the inception of the PPACA); see also Nelson D. Schwartz, Swiss 
Model for Health Care Thrives Without Public Option, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at A1 
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law and a cure for any latent ills therein, Switzerland’s health care system 
offers ample lessons for the U.S.26  Indeed, the PPACA derives many of its 
elements from the Swiss system: an individual mandate, state-administered 
exchanges of private insurance, and government subsidies for low-income 
classes.27  These approaches have proved compatible with Switzerland’s 
democratic structure, which consists of one central government and twenty-
three semi-autonomous cantons.28  These cantons serve a role in the Swiss 
national health system similar to that U.S. states will be expected to serve 
under the PPACA.  Perhaps most important, the Swiss system works: the rise 
of healthcare costs has slowed since its implementation, while coverage has 
expanded to virtually all citizens.29  
The U.S. should draw from Switzerland’s experience as states consider 
how to best serve their low-income populations while simultaneously 
addressing budget deficits and other economic factors.  Switzerland has 
shown that health insurance exchanges, which put individuals in control of 
their health care decisions, provide a viable alternative to welfare programs 
as a means of reducing health disparities.30  This model, adopted in a 
modified form by the PPACA, should square with the individualistic 
ideologies of conservative leaders who oppose an expansion of Medicaid.  
This Note argues that states should embrace the insurance exchanges, or else 
risk worsening conditions for wide swaths of their populations.  
First, Part II of this Note will explore some of the shortcomings of the 
U.S. health care system before the PPACA, focusing on access issues and 
rising costs, and then explain provisions of the PPACA that aim to rectify 
these problems.  Part II will also introduce the Swiss health care system as an 
archetype for implementation of the PPACA.  Part III will delve deeper into 
the choices U.S. states face with respect to enforcing these provisions, 
ultimately asserting that Switzerland’s experience should give dubious state 
leaders confidence in private insurance exchanges as the right course of 
action for the U.S.  
                                                                                                                   
(discussing the emergence of the Swiss analogy in the political discourse immediately 
preceding the enactment of the PPACA). 
 26 Kreier & Zweifel, supra note 24, at 90. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Donahue, supra note 24, at 409. 
 29 Kreier & Zweifel, supra note 24, at 101–02. 
 30 TANNER, supra note 2, at 28. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Access Issues in the U.S. Result from an Insurance System that Functions 
Inequitably Across Socioeconomic Lines 
While the U.S. health care system is often heralded as one of the world’s 
best, not all of its citizens receive such excellent care.31  In reality, health 
care in the U.S. works like any capitalist marketplace: people get what they 
pay for.  According to a 2009 report, more than half of the low-income 
Americans who did not receive adequate health care failed to do so because 
of cost.32  The insurance market, currently under reform, did little to help this 
socioeconomic class,33 as evidenced by the large number of low- and middle-
income individuals who chose to forgo health insurance altogether.34 
The socioeconomic class at the center of this Note is comprised of lower- 
and middle-class Americans not enrolled in Medicaid.  These individuals 
were not well served under the old system, and may not fare much better 
under some states’ approaches to the PPACA.  This group can be further 
broken down into three subsets: (1) adults who do not receive coverage 
through an employer because they are self-employed, unemployed, or 
working for a small employer; (2) low-income families that are not poor 
enough to qualify for Medicaid; and (3) childless adults, who are not covered 
under most states’ existing Medicaid programs.  Left to fend for themselves, 
these people had little bargaining power in the pre-PPACA insurance market, 
and were therefore charged comparatively high premiums.35  Moreover, as 
the U.S. economy has weakened, more employers have passed health costs 
onto their employees in an effort to balance their budgets, causing even more 
individuals to forego the burden of purchasing personal health insurance.36   
                                                                                                                   
 31 See sources cited supra note 9. 
 32 MICHAEL DE LOOPER, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., HEALTH AT A GLANCE 
2009, at 143 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/health/health-systems/44117530.pdf.  
In this study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a 
multinational research group, “low-income” is defined as income below the national average, 
and “unmet care need” is defined as the failure to seek care; missed medical tests, treatment or 
follow-ups; or failure to fill prescriptions. Id. 
 33 Kimberly Cogdell Boies, Using the Flexibility of the Affordable Care Act to Reduce 
Health Disparities by Creatively Structuring Health Insurance Exchanges, 26 J. CIV. RTS. & 
ECON. DEV. 1, 4 (2011). 
 34 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 21 (2011), http://www.census.gov/pr 
od/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf.  As of 2010, when the PPACA was enacted, 16.3% of the U.S. 
population, roughly 50 million people, were without health insurance.  Id.  
 35 Boies, supra note 33, at 4. 
 36 Pratt, supra note 3, at 504. 
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Predictably, higher insurance costs resulted in high numbers of uninsured 
citizens in the U.S. as compared to other developed nations.37  In 2011, 
15.7% of Americans were uninsured, a high number in light of the near-
universal coverage of citizens in most other developed nations, including 
Switzerland.38  The percentage of low-income citizens who chose not to buy 
insurance, 25.4% in 2011, was substantially higher than the population’s 
average.39  Historically, minority groups have uninsured rates higher than the 
national average, particularly Hispanics.40  Young adults also struggled to 
obtain coverage under the old system; more than 27% of adults between the 
ages of nineteen and thirty-four went uninsured in 2011.41  
Medicaid was designed to correct for the disproportionate access 
problems of disadvantaged classes, but the program’s reach is subject to 
federal eligibility requirements as well as additional, discretionary state 
restrictions.42  Since the inception of Medicaid, states have had the authority 
to determine exactly what portion of their populations should have access to 
government-funded care, and some states have greatly restricted access to 
their Medicaid funds.43  For example, in Mississippi, a yearly income of over 
$8,200 makes one ineligible for Medicaid.44  Texas and Louisiana define 
poverty even more conservatively, only allowing those with yearly incomes 
below $5,000 to enroll in Medicaid.45  Alternatively, the PPACA asks states 
to expand Medicaid coverage to a new national standard: up to 133% of the 
poverty level.46  But with so many states promising to reject the expansion, 
the issue of low-income individuals falling through the cracks in the 
insurance market is still problematic.  
                                                                                                                   
 37 See DE LOOPER, supra note 32, at 143 (ranking the U.S. against twenty-nine other 
developed nations, only three of which had less than 95% of their populations insured).  
 38 DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 34, at 22. 
 39 Id. at 25.  “Low-income,” for the purpose of this statistic, is defined as those with 
household incomes lower than $25,000. Id. 
 40 Id. at 24 (noting 30% of Hispanics were uninsured in 2011, according to the study). 
 41 Id. 
 42 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WHERE ARE STATES TODAY? MEDICAID AND CHIP 
ELIGIBILITY LEVELS FOR CHILDREN AND NON-DISABLED ADULTS 1–2 [hereinafter WHERE ARE 
STATES TODAY?], available at http://www.kff.org/Medicaid/upload/7993-02.pdf (last updated 
July 2012). 
 43 Carla K. Johnson & Kelli Kennedy, Anti-Medicaid States: Earning $11,000 is Too Much, 
DENV. POST (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_21313761/anti-med 
icaid-states-earning-11-000-is-too. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Pratt, supra note 3, at 520. 
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B.  The Insurance Structure Driving the U.S. Health Care System is Partly to 
Blame for the System’s High Costs 
The U.S. spends more on health care than any other country in the 
world.47  In recent years, health care spending has exceeded 17% of the 
nation’s gross domestic product, compared to 8.8% in 1980.48  The total U.S. 
health care expenditure per capita is almost twice that of any other country.49  
While it is axiomatic that a country offering superior care would spend more, 
no truism can explain away such exorbitant costs.  Even the presumption that 
the U.S. offers superior care is debatable, as the U.S. system fares poorly on 
metrics such as life expectancy and infant mortality compared to nations with 
similar economies.50  Even more troubling is that costs continue to rise faster 
than the rate of inflation.51  Given the country’s rapidly aging population that 
requires more care and higher Medicare expenditures, the rate of healthcare 
costs is likely to rise further if unabated.52 
High costs are reflected in higher expenditures by health care providers, 
which in turn creates higher costs to both those paying medical bills out-of-
pocket and those paying for health insurance.53  Since 2002, health insurance 
premiums in the U.S. have risen by 97%,54 helping to explain a culture in 
which insurance is often viewed as an undesirable option.  Yet the risks are 
even graver when one chooses not to have insurance, or to have too little 
insurance, and is stuck paying for outrageously priced care when health 
needs arise.55  Such nonparticipation affects both the patient and society at 
large.  The uninsured patient will likely avoid basic and preventive care, and 
then may be unable to pay for more expensive emergency care that is later 
required.56  This is exemplified by the fact that more personal bankruptcies in 
the U.S. result from medical bills than from any other cause.57  Each failure 
to pay has ripple effects throughout the health care system, as the insolvent 
                                                                                                                   
 47 DE LOOPER, supra note 32, at 160.  In 2007, the U.S. spent more than $7,000 per person 
on health care. Id.  
 48 Pratt, supra note 3, at 579. 
 49 DE LOOPER, supra note 32, at 160.  The second-highest health care expenditures per 
capita in 2007 were those of Norway, which spent $4,763 per person on health care.  Id. 
 50 Pratt, supra note 3, at 495 n.1.  
 51 TANNER, supra note 2, at 2. 
 52 Anna M. Rappaport, Policy Environment for Health Benefits: Implications for Employer 
Plans, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1107, 1111 (1994). 
 53 Susan Alder Channick, Come the Revolution: Are We Finally Ready for Universal Health 
Insurance?, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 303, 311–12 (2003). 
 54 Chad Terhune, Health Coverage Prices Rise 4%, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), http://arti 
cles.latimes.com/2012/sep/12/business/la-fi-employer-health-costs-20120912. 
 55 Pratt, supra note 3, at 506. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
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patient’s unpaid treatment costs are ultimately absorbed by those paying 
taxes and insurance premiums.58  
Costs are also relevant to this discussion insofar as they play a major role 
in each state’s calculus regarding the PPACA’s government-spending 
provisions.  While the federal government initially will cover 100% of the 
added Medicaid costs, its contribution will gradually diminish.59  State 
governors facing budget deficits are reluctant to adopt a long-term spending 
plan that will eventually cost their states billions.60  However, there are also 
reasons to think the Medicaid expansion would lower costs.  As with the 
insurance exchanges, putting more insured patients into the system would 
help curtail the epidemic of uncompensated care.61  These diverging views 
will be detailed later, leading to the conclusion that the PPACA’s insurance 
exchanges can lower costs while expanding coverage.  
C.  Relevant Provisions of the PPACA 
The PPACA is a labyrinthine law, addressing a host of issues that 
currently plague the U.S. health care system.62  This Note does not aim to 
address all of these issues.  Rather, the discussion will focus on two: (1) the 
now-optional expansion of Medicaid, and (2) the creation of state-based 
American Health Benefit Exchanges (AHBEs).  In examining these 
provisions, this Note will also touch on the Act’s individual mandate, along 
with its some of the Act’s changes to Medicare and to the existing insurance 
market.  
1.  The Medicaid Expansion 
The Medicaid expansion was not the PPACA’s most radical provision, 
yet it has become controversial in the context of the U.S.’s current economic 
downturn.  The provision modifies the decades-old public program that has 
provided extensive coverage to low- and middle-class children and pregnant 
women, but only provided limited coverage to other adults.63   Historically, 
Medicaid required states to cover parents up to a varying income level (based 
on a state’s welfare eligibility), and allowed states to extend their coverage 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Channick, supra note 53. 
 59 Pratt, supra note 3, at 520. 
 60 Ehley, supra note 21.  
 61 CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & TRANSFORMATION, THE ACA’S MEDICAID 
EXPANSION: MICHIGAN IMPACT passim (Oct. 2012), http://www.chrt.org/assets/price-of-care/ 
CHRT-Issue-Brief-October-2012.pdf. 
 62 See SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 12 (detailing many facets of 
the new law intended to fix current problems). 
 63 WHERE ARE STATES TODAY?, supra note 42, at 1.  
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with the aid of matching federal funds.64  Federal minimum coverage in all 
states accounted only for those parents well below the federal poverty level, 
and states were given broad discretion as to whether that coverage should be 
increased.65  Although some states did increase coverage,66 others retained 
Medicaid as a lifeline for only the poorest residents.67  
The PPACA sought to establish a uniform minimum coverage 
requirement, i.e., one that would not vary among states.68  The original 
version of the Act would have expanded Medicaid coverage to all eligible 
individuals: children, pregnant women, parents, and childless adults, with 
incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty level as of 2014.69  Federal 
funding would have covered 100% of all newly eligible enrollees from 2014 
to 2016, then would have decreased to 95% of new costs in 2017, then would 
have diminished gradually until locking in at 90% in 2020 and beyond.70  
This is still how the law will operate for states that choose to adopt it.71 
The original version of the PPACA had a stick along with this carrot, 
threatening to withhold all federal assistance for Medicaid from states that 
did not adopt the expansion.72  The U.S. Supreme Court held in the 
abovementioned Sebelius decision that such a requirement constituted a 
coercive action intended to force states to accept the expansion.73  The Court 
thus severed the mandatory expansion from the Act and allowed the rest of 
the Act to stand.74  States now may decline the expansion without any 
corresponding withdrawal of funding toward their existing Medicaid 
programs. 
                                                                                                                   
 64 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FEDERAL CORE REQUIREMENTS AND STATE 
OPTIONS IN MEDICAID CURRENT POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES 1 (2011), http://www.kff.org/health-
reform/fact-sheet/federal-core-requirements-and-state-options-in/. 
 65 WHERE ARE STATES TODAY?, supra note 42, at 5.  As of July 2012, federal requirements 
were as low as 11% of the federal poverty level in Alabama and Louisiana. Id. 
 66 Id. (listing the pre-PPACA Medicaid eligibility limits in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia, including states where parents with incomes up to 200% of the federal poverty 
level or above were eligible, such as Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin). 
 67 Id. at 2. 
 68 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001, 124 Stat. 119, 
271–79 (2010); SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 12, at 1. 
 69 SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 12, at 1. 
 70 Id. 
 71 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., IMPLEMENTING THE ACA’S MEDICAID-RELATED 
HEALTH REFORM PROVISIONS AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 1 (2012), http://www. 
kff.org/healthreform/upload/8348.pdf. 
 72 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582 (U.S. 2012). 
 73 Id. at 2604. 
 74 Id. at 2608. 
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2.  Health Insurance Exchanges 
To address the underinsurance of the country’s lower and middle classes, 
the PPACA provides for the establishment of government-sponsored 
exchanges of private insurance plans.75  A primary aim of these exchanges is 
affordability, which the government hopes to achieve through both managed 
competition and direct subsidies.76  
First, tight regulation of insurers licensed to sell AHBEs—surely an 
attractive market based solely on the number of new customers77—is 
intended to keep insurance companies honest.78 The government will also 
provide direct subsidies (“premium credits”) to qualified individuals with 
incomes between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty level.79  These 
credits will be based on enrollees’ incomes, ensuring that poorer individuals 
are spending a lower percentage of their earnings on health care than those 
with higher incomes.  
The exchanges will use government regulation not only to achieve 
affordability, but also quality.  Insurers will only be permitted to offer 
“qualified health plans” (QHPs) to customers in the exchanges.80  QHPs have 
cost-sharing limits81 and must provide “essential health benefits” such as 
ambulatory care, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn 
care, mental health and substance abuse services, prescription drugs, and 
preventive care.82  The exchanges will provide comprehensive websites 
where customers can compare QHPs and enroll.83 
The PPACA provides that if states do not establish an insurance exchange 
by January 1, 2014, a federal exchange will serve that states’ citizens.84  As a 
practical matter, the viability of a far-reaching federal exchange in the face of 
                                                                                                                   
 75 Pratt, supra note 3, at 515. 
 76 Boies, supra note 33, at 18. 
 77 See Tom Murphy, Health Care Overhaul Seen as Boon to Insurance Industry, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 2, 2012, available at http://www.telegram.com/article/20121002/NE 
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insurance enrollees will lead to $55 billion in premiums to the insurance industry in 2014). 
 78 Pratt, supra note 3, at 519. 
 79 SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 12, at 2. 
 80 Pratt, supra note 3, at 516. 
 81 Id.  Cost-sharing is the requirement that purchasers of insurance contribute some out-of-
pocket payments toward their insurance plans, beyond just their premiums.  The most 
common examples are deductibles and co-payments. Id. 
 82 Id. at 517. 
 83 Id. at 516.  For an example of an online insurance exchange, see that of Massachusetts, 
which has been in place as a purely statewide measure since 2006, the same year in which 
Massachusetts enacted an individual mandate.  HEALTH CONNECTOR: HEALTH INSURANCE FOR 
MASSACHUSETTS RESIDENTS, https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/site/connector (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
 84 Pratt, supra note 3, at 516. 
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widespread noncooperation by states85 remains to be seen.  Also unclear is 
what will happen to people between a state’s Medicaid cutoff and 100% of 
the federal poverty line if a state denies the Medicaid expansion and the 
exchange, and the surrogate federal exchange does not extend subsidies to 
people below that same line.  Those in limbo between the two convergent 
thresholds face an uncertain future, which will be explored in the analysis 
section of this Note. 
D.  An Introduction to Switzerland: Its Governmental Philosophy and Health 
Care System 
The Swiss Confederation is a republic made up of twenty-three sovereign 
cantons allied under one federal government.86  Each canton is represented in 
the Swiss Parliament, whose delegates are elected by popular vote, much like 
the U.S. legislature.87  Far from a socialized system, the Swiss government is 
said to only intervene where the private sector produces unsatisfactory 
results,88 a notion that seems to echo in the debate over U.S. health reform.  
Also similar to the U.S., powers not explicitly granted to the central 
government are reserved to the cantons.89  These similarities analogize Swiss 
and U.S. healthcare laws insofar as they must both be achieved through the 
symbiosis of national and local governing bodies. 
Switzerland is a wealthy nation; its income per capita currently is among 
the highest in the world.90  Loyal to capitalist principles,91 the Swiss have 
nonetheless managed to maintain relatively equal income distribution.  The 
World Bank ranks Switzerland ahead of the U.S. in terms of income 
equality.92  
                                                                                                                   
 85 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ESTABLISHING HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: 
AN OVERVIEW OF STATE EFFORTS 1 (2012), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8213-
2.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: AN OVERVIEW].  As of August 2012, 
seven states had announced they would not create an exchange, sixteen were studying their 
options, and nine had taken no significant activity toward establishing an exchange or 
rejecting their duty.  Id. 
 86 EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS, HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN 
TRANSITION: SWITZERLAND 1 (2009), at http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/ 
96411/E68670.pdf.  
 87 Id. at 3. 
 88 Id. at 9. 
 89 Donahue, supra note 24, at 409. 
 90 Country Comparison: GDP – Per Capita (PPP), CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https:// 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2012) (ranking Switzerland seventeenth). 
 91 Donahue, supra note 24, at 421. 
 92 Klaus W. Deininger & Lyn Squire, World Bank, A New Dataset Measuring Income 
Inequality, 10 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 565 (1996). 
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Despite being more economically homogenous, Switzerland remains an 
apt comparison to the U.S. because of its free-market nature.  This fact has 
particular relevance to health care. Though approximately 98% of Swiss 
citizens have health insurance,93 the government does not serve as their 
insurer, as in a socialized system like Great Britain’s.94  There are no public 
insurance plans, and there is ample competition among health care 
providers.95  The Swiss government pays for only 24.9% of total health care 
expenditures in the country;96 such spending amounts to only 2.7% of its 
GDP.97  
How are the Swiss able to cover so many people without a government-
run insurance option?  First, the government is not completely disengaged.  
By administering and regulating exchanges of private insurance,98 the 
government plays a unique role in its citizens’ individualized purchasing 
processes, a role that the framers of the PPACA have emulated.  Further, the 
Swiss government requires that all citizens purchase at least Compulsory 
Basic Social Insurance (CBSI),99 similar to the PPACA’s individual 
mandate, and provides subsidies to buyers in proportion to their incomes.100  
These private subsidies are Switzerland’s primary means of solving 
access issues of lower-income individuals.  That is, there is no equivalent to 
Medicaid or Medicare in the Swiss system.101  All purchasers, regardless of 
age or income, choose from the same menu of private insurers;102 employers 
rarely offer insurance to their employees.103  The subsidies (“Income 
Premium Reductions”) include both federal and cantonal funds, with cantons 
having some say over the exact amount of subsidies to be distributed.104  The 
general aim is to limit individuals’ insurance expenses to around 8% of their 
incomes, though that percentage varies among cantons.105  The wealthy are 
not eligible for subsidies.106 
                                                                                                                   
 93 Donahue, supra note 24, at 423. 
 94 TANNER, supra note 2, at 24. 
 95 Id. at 25. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Avik Roy, Why Switzerland Has the World’s Best Health Care System, FORBES (Apr. 29, 
2011, 5:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2011/04/29/why-switzerland-has-the-world 
s-best-health-care-system. 
 98 Kreier & Zweifel, supra note 24, at 92–93. 
 99 Id. at 92. 
 100 Id. at 97. 
 101 Id. at 110; Donahue, supra note 24. 
 102 Kreier & Zweifel, supra note 24, at 110.  
 103 TANNER, supra note 2, at 25. 
 104 EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS, supra note 86, at 29. 
 105 Kreier & Zweifel, supra note 24, at 97. 
 106 Donahue, supra note 24, at 423–24. 
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The sum of these rules is a system where nearly all citizens are required 
to pay some portion of their insurance costs.  Government involvement is 
further limited to basic benefits packages, which are the only kind issued 
through the CBSI market.107  Supplemental insurance can be purchased at the 
discretion of the insured, but is not eligible for subsidies.108  
Insurers authorized to sell through Switzerland’s government exchange 
are closely regulated.109  For example, standard benefits packages have both 
minimum and maximum coverage requirements and thus end up sharing 
many similarities across various insurers.110  Moreover, participating insurers 
must price their premiums according to “community rating,” a method (also 
adopted by the PPACA111) where all residents of a defined geographic area 
are charged the same amount, irrespective of their individual health risks or 
medical histories.112  Similarly, the Swiss system prohibits insurers from 
denying coverage to applicants based on pre-existing conditions, a practice 
known as “guaranteed issue.”113  Finally, Swiss insurance providers are not 
allowed to make a profit on basic, compulsory plans.114  They can, however, 
profit on supplemental insurance, which has been purchased by 
approximately 40% of the Swiss population.115  
Another important function of the Swiss system is cost-sharing between 
insurance companies and their enrollees.116  Switzerland’s healthcare law 
imposes high deductibles on purchasers, with additional co-insurance 
payments on top of that.117  At a minimum, the law requires purchasers of a 
CBSI to pay a $400 deductible fee and to pay 10% of costs exceeding the 
deductible.118  However, the actual copayments borne by Swiss citizens tend 
to be much higher, as insurers offer attractively low premiums to those who 
                                                                                                                   
 107 Kreier & Zweifel, supra note 24, at 92–93. 
 108 Id. at 93–94. 
 109 EUROPEAN OBSERVATORY ON HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS, supra note 86, at 22. 
 110 TANNER, supra note 2, at 25–26. 
 111 SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 12, at 5. 
 112 Kreier & Zweifel, supra note 24, at 93; see also Donahue, supra note 24, at 424–25.  In a 
voluntary insurance system, insurance companies are forced to adjust their ratings based on 
purchasers’ characteristics, as charging everyone the same rate would cause comparatively 
healthy people not to participate.  Only through a compulsory system, wherein insurance 
companies can rely on consistent enrollment across race, gender, and health lines, can these 
companies curtail this process of premium rating.  Id.  
 113 Kreier & Zweifel, supra note 24, at 93. 
 114 Id. at 94. 
 115 TANNER, supra note 2, at 27. 
 116 Kreier & Zweifel, supra note 24, at 96. 
 117 Id. Out-of-pocket payments in Switzerland account for almost 6% of total household 
consumption in Switzerland, compared to about 3% in the U.S.  DE LOOPER, supra note 32, at 
146.  
 118 DE LOOPER, supra note 32, at 146. 
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accept higher deductibles.119  This practice, combined with the popularity of 
supplemental insurance, has led Swiss citizens to incur some of the highest 
out-of-pocket expenditures of any population in the world.120 
E.  Health Outcomes in Switzerland 
The results of the Swiss health care system are largely positive, at perhaps 
a necessary price.  By many popular standards, the quality of health care in 
Switzerland is quite high.  Wait times for medical services, a common 
problem in many socialized systems with global caps on health 
expenditures,121 are virtually nonexistent in Switzerland.122  According to a 
2007 study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), Switzerland’s life expectancy ranked second in the world, behind 
Japan, at just under eighty-two years.123  Switzerland also performs better 
than the OECD average in heart disease mortality,124 cancer mortality,125 and 
adults who report being in good health.126  Its infant mortality rate is equal to 
the OECD average but it is still almost half of the U.S. rate.127 
Further, as mentioned above, access rates in Switzerland benefit from the 
individual mandate and from government subsidies.  While disparities exist 
as to the extent and quality of care received, typical in any market-driven 
system,128 almost everyone receives basic care.  Furthermore, the Swiss 
appear satisfied with their care: more than 71% of voters rejected a 2007 
referendum to replace the current system with a single-payer approach.129  
As expected, Switzerland pays correlatively for its system’s quality.  The 
Swiss rank third in the world in health care spending relative to GDP, behind 
the U.S. and France,130 and third in healthcare spending per capita, behind 
the U.S. and Norway.131  However, crucial to this discussion is how little of 
                                                                                                                   
 119 Id.; TANNER, supra note 2, at 26. 
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that spending comes directly from the Swiss government.132  The Swiss are 
wealthy people, operating within a system that does not limit their ability to 
spend freely on health care.133  This explains, at least in part, how a country 
can amass such high health costs relative to GDP, despite lower government 
contributions, than any country in the developed world.134  The U.S. could 
address many of its system’s woes simply by meeting Switzerland’s 
government-spending benchmark; the PPACA’s insurance exchanges are 
indeed projected to shift costs away from the federal government.135  
However, if the U.S. also takes measures to mitigate out-of-pocket costs to 
low-income participants in its insurance exchanges, which this Note later 
argues it can, the U.S. can reduce overall costs to consumers in a way the 
spendthrift Swiss do not.  
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Current Dilemmas Facing U.S. States 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius undoubtedly added new 
contours to the debate over health care access in the U.S.  Now that states are 
permitted to reject the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion136 and may do so 
notwithstanding the law’s mandate that everyone purchase insurance, how 
can states help to provide coverage to those who cannot afford it?  This 
question is essentially twofold.  First, states must decide whether to accept 
the Medicaid expansion.  States declining the expansion face a second, more 
speculative question: how to care for lower and middle classes, now required 
to buy insurance, in the expansion’s absence.  
1.  The States’ Initial Decision: Whether to Expand Medicaid 
As to the first determination, it is already clear that many U.S. states do 
not intend to follow the PPACA’s course.137  Reasons for their recalcitrance 
                                                                                                                   
 132 Donahue, supra note 24, at 430. 
 133 TANNER, supra note 2, at 28. 
 134 Roy, supra note 97. 
 135 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE 
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 136 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelis, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (U.S. 2012). 
 137 Ehley, supra note 21. 
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run from budget shortages138 to political opposition139 to ideological 
convictions about the role of government.140  Although the federal 
government will initially pay for 100% of newly eligible enrollees, some 
states are worried about long-term costs once federal contributions subside 
(even though such contributions will never fall below 90%).141  Further, 
some policy analysts believe that the individual mandate created another, 
unsubsidized group of new Medicaid enrollees: those who were eligible for 
Medicaid before March 2010 but did not enroll.142  If this group seeks to 
satisfy the insurance mandate by enrolling in Medicaid, states will be 
expected to subsidize them; the federal government will only subsidize new 
enrollees between states’ previous eligibility cutoffs and 133% of the poverty 
level.143  Thus, states’ calculations as to the cost of the Medicaid expansion 
are not solely limited to newly eligible enrollees.  
Others argue that the Medicaid expansion will reduce costs for states, for 
three primary reasons: (1) many of the newly eligible enrollees will be those 
previously covered under state-funded programs, such as community mental 
health systems; (2) state-funded hospitals will benefit from providing less 
uncompensated emergency care, solving the so-called “free rider” 
problem;144 and (3) states, as employers, will see a reduction in health 
insurance premiums because of those savings to state-funded providers.145  
Hospitals, particularly so-called “safety net” hospitals, which are heavily 
subsidized to care for a disproportionate number of uninsured or 
underinsured patients, are chief among those supporting the expansion as a 
cost-effective choice for states.146  Their reasons relate to the PPACA’s 
                                                                                                                   
 138 See id. (quoting Florida Governor Rick Scott, who called Medicaid the “fastest-growing 
part of [the] state budget,” and said the expansion “doesn’t bode well”). 
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various cuts in federal funding, such as lower reimbursements to providers 
treating Medicare patients and reductions in subsidies to “safety-net” 
hospitals,147 also called disproportionate share hospitals.148  Since some 
hospitals rely on these funds to operate,149 whatever system states adopt must 
somehow correct for these crucial losses.  
The Medicaid expansion was one such correction.  First, the increased 
number of insured patients would presumably lead to an influx of regular, 
nonurgent visits, and a substantial decline in uncompensated care.150  
Further, the PPACA countered its reduction in Medicare reimbursements 
with an increase in Medicaid dollars flowing to states.151  Thus, states 
choosing not to adopt the Medicaid expansion will incur the same cuts in 
subsidies as every other state, but the countervailing benefit from federal 
Medicaid funding will be significantly lower.152    
Whatever the economic merits of the Medicaid expansion, this Note does 
not seek to sway readers or policymakers in any particular direction.  Rather, 
it addresses the fallout of many states’ decisions to reject the expansion.153  
In this scenario, states should be considering alternate methods of aiding 
their lower classes in purchasing now-mandatory health insurance.  
2.  The States’ Options After Rejecting the Medicaid Expansion 
The issues posed by states declining the Medicaid Expansion seem facile 
compared to the complexity that has followed some states’ wholesale 
rejections of the PPACA.  Because the Act contains provisions that will still 
affect people nationwide, excluding many of these states’ citizens from the 
individual insurance marketplace (as would happen to people above the 
states’ Medicaid thresholds but below the federal exchanges’ subsidy 
                                                                                                                   
dicaid-decision-could-put-hospitals-at-ris/nRPQ4 (quoting hospital advocates who expected 
higher Medicaid reimbursements to offset decreases in Medicare reimbursements and 
disproportionate share payments but will not experience such an offset without more Medicaid 
patients).  
 147 Elizabeth Stawicki, Safety-Net Hospitals Brace for Cut to Federal Subsidies, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 14, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/October/15/saf 
ety-net-hospitals.aspx. 
 148 Lisa Potetz, Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, Medicare Spending and Financing: A 
Primer, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 5 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/med 
icare/upload/7731-03.pdf.  
 149 Stawicki, supra note 147. 
 150 Teegardin, supra note 146. 
 151 SUMMARY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 12, at 1–2. 
 152 Teegardin, supra note 146. 
 153 See Daniel Malloy, Deal Rejects Expansion of Medicaid, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 28, 
2012), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/deal-rejects-expansion-of-me 
dicaid/nRMfK (reporting on Georgia Governor Nathan Deal’s announced rejection of the 
expansion). 
2013] HEALTH CARE LESSONS FROM SWITZERLAND  821 
thresholds) portends a muddle of legal and ethical problems for state and 
federal leaders. Most notably, low-income residents of these states will 
struggle to pay for insurance, defeating many of the aims of the PPACA’s 
insurance model.154  Additionally, healthcare providers will experience cuts 
in subsidies without a corresponding increase in insured patients.155  
The solution is largely built into the law these states oppose.  Even when 
failing to extend coverage to low-income individuals through the Medicaid 
expansion, states can still help these individuals by embracing the health 
insurance exchanges established through the PPACA.  
B.  Why States Should Implement Insurance Exchanges to Increase Access 
and Lower Costs, Part One: Theory 
Health insurance exchanges can increase access and lower costs through 
transparency, accountability, managed competition, and preventive care.156  
First, when an insurance company’s plans and prices are made transparent to 
consumers on an independent, third-party website, the veil that has 
traditionally protected the insurance industry will be substantially lifted.157  
Unlike government- or employer-sponsored insurance plans, an exchange for 
individuals would put cost considerations in the hands of consumers, thereby 
incentivizing insurers to meet consumers’ cost demands.158  Because costs 
are the foremost obstacle to health care in the U.S.,159 any methodology that 
contains costs to individual purchasers will likely have a positive effect on 
access.  
Second, the exchanges will serve as gatekeepers of insurance practices, 
holding eligible insurers accountable for conduct that may advance health 
disparities.160  The PPACA already combats longstanding insurance practices, 
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both inside and outside of the exchanges, through its community rating and 
guaranteed issue requirements, which prevent discrimination of purchasers 
based on socioeconomic status and medical histories respectively.161  The law 
goes a step further with respect to insurance providers within the exchanges, 
regulating their benefit plans,162 cost-sharing limits,163 transparency,164 
accreditations,165 and application processes.166  The PPACA’s exchanges 
envisage a system where insurers’ freedom to shape their benefits plans is 
limited, to the betterment of the group most affected by such conduct: low-
income individuals seeking coverage on their own.167 
Third, the insurance exchanges aim to generate competition among 
insurers, while not compromising coverage.168  This can occur because 
insurers, enticed by the scope of the exchange’s prospective market,169 can 
only reach these new customers by embracing the necessary regulations.  
Further, the exchanges can increase competition by limiting the number of 
plans offered through the exchange.170  Whether an exchange puts a hard cap 
on the number of plans it offers or creates qualitative limitations through 
extensive eligibility requirements, insurers seeking admission will face 
pressure to lower costs, extend access, or both.171  U.S. states that choose to 
establish their own exchanges under the PPACA can play a significant role 
in setting these limitations and tailoring them to the needs of their unique 
populations.172 
Finally, insurance exchanges have the potential to reduce long-term costs 
to the health care system by encouraging preventive care.  If the PPACA’s 
exchanges are successful at expanding access to health care, as antecedent 
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exchanges have been,173 more people will receive basic and routine medical 
care, avoiding the high costs of preventable emergency care.174  In addition 
to this natural consequence of access to insurance, the PPACA further 
promotes preventive care by eliminating cost-sharing—e.g., co-pays and 
deductibles—for certain preventive care offered under QHPs.175  There is 
some debate as to whether preventive care in fact reduces health care costs in 
the aggregate.176  However, the effect of preventive care on general 
wellness,177 coupled with its benefit to healthcare providers compared to 
uncompensated emergency care,178 makes such care a desirable element of 
the PPACA whether or not it produces significant savings.   
Given the virtues of the PPACA’s insurance exchanges, it is paradoxical 
that so many states are resisting their implementation.  First, the Act gives 
the states broad latitude to customize their exchanges to their preferences.179  
For example, states can choose whether to open their exchanges to all 
eligible QHPs (the “clearinghouse” model) or selectively contract with 
certain QHPs that best serve their individualized needs, perhaps favoring 
local insurance companies (the “active purchaser” model).180  The fact that 
this and other critical decisions are reserved to the states suggests the 
exchanges are not necessarily an affront to states’ rights.  Compared to a 
nationally run exchange or a public insurance option, state-run exchanges 
could even be said to advance those rights.  
Also, the exchanges’ free-market nature should appeal to many of the 
states that are currently resisting them.  Of the sixteen states that have either 
formally announced their noncompliance with the PPACA’s exchange 
requirement or have taken no action to implement an exchange, fourteen 
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have Republican governors.181  Yet the exchanges discourage free-riders, 
keep money in the private sector, and preserve personal choice—all concepts 
traditionally associated with conservative political ideology.182  Indeed, the 
idea of partially government-subsidized purchases of private insurance 
within an individual mandate system was advocated in 1989 by the 
conservative think tank,183 the Heritage Foundation;184 adopted by 
Republican governor and 2012 Republican presidential nominee Mitt 
Romney in Massachusetts;185 and recently given more Republican support.186 
States choosing to decline the Medicaid expansion should, for the 
foregoing reasons, find a happy medium in the insurance exchanges.  The 
Department of Health and Human Services has clarified that states failing to 
establish their own exchanges by the January 2014 deadline are not 
precluded from doing so at any time in the future, provided that the 
exchanges comply with the federal requirements.187  Thus, even those states 
now delegating establishment of exchanges to the federal government, or 
choosing a state-federal partnership exchange, can still embrace the concept 
of state-run exchanges, and will still receive federal funding to implement 
them.188  
Further, in establishing their exchanges, it is essential that states work 
with the federal government to extend the same subsidies to those below 
100% of the poverty level as provided to those between 100% and 133% of 
the poverty level in the PPACA’s current form.189  As mentioned above, 
many states’ Medicaid programs have maximum income restrictions well 
                                                                                                                   
 181 Id. at 1.  New Hampshire and Missouri are the only Democrat-led states that have 
rejected the exchanges or abstained from any action related to their implementation. Id. 
 182 Kleinke, supra note 160. 
 183 See THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, http://www.heritage.org/about (last visited Oct. 21, 
2012) (describing the Heritage Foundation’s mission as “promot[ing] conservative public 
policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, [and] individual 
freedom . . .”).  
 184 THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, A NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM FOR AMERICA 51 (Stuart M. 
Butler & Edmund F. Haislmaier eds., 1989), available at http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. 
com/1989/pdf/ci_0891950494.pdf. 
 185 Kleinke, supra note 160. 
 186 See Elizabeth Stawicki, Pawlenty Does an About-Face on Insurance Exchange Idea, 
MINN. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 8, 2010), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/10/ 
08/pawlenty-health-exchanges/ (reporting that Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty had sought 
in 2007 to establish an exchange similar to those called for under the PPACA, but was 
nonetheless opposing the PPACA’s exchanges).  
 187 Election to Operate an Exchange After 2014, 45 C.F.R. § 155.106 (2012). 
 188 HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 85, at 5. 
 189 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a), -(b)(3)(A)(i), -(c)(1)(A) (West 2012).  The PPACA offers 
subsidies to “applicable taxpayer[s]” “[u]p to 133 percent” of the poverty level, but later 
defines “applicable taxpayer[s]” as those whose incomes equal or exceed 100% but do not 
exceed 400%.  
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below the federal poverty level.190  Therefore, insurance exchanges in those 
states must, in lieu of the Medicaid expansion, provide alternative assistance 
to people with incomes below 100% of the poverty level, where the PPACA 
currently cuts off subsidies (having intended that states’ expanded Medicaid 
programs would cover those below the line).191   
Some have suggested these citizens can still receive subsidies by 
exaggerating their projected income to at least the federal poverty level, thus 
qualifying for subsidies through federal exchanges.192  Besides the difficulty 
of communicating this subterfuge to the masses, it seems perverse that the 
government would not simply correct a law that was causing such 
government-condoned illegality (i.e., lying on an application for government 
assistance).  
Moreover, because such subsidies would be in the form of federal income 
tax credits,193 this extension should not significantly affect states’ cost 
considerations regarding the PPACA.  Rather, this change should be viewed 
as essential to preventing the very sort of coverage gaps that existed in the 
pre-PPACA health care system. 
C.  Why States Should Implement Insurance Exchanges to Increase Access 
and Lower Costs, Part Two: Lessons from Switzerland 
When the Swiss government enacted its most recent round of health care 
reforms in 1996, it emphasized solidarity among its citizenry.194  Swiss 
authorities believed the only way to remedy inequitable health insurance 
practices was through compulsory insurance, which would lend practical 
value to features such as community rating and guaranteed issue.195  With 
these regulations in place, Switzerland has extended coverage to virtually all 
of its citizens—a rare feat considering it was achieved through pro-market 
means.196  Consumers seeking to purchase insurance can easily compare 
                                                                                                                   
 190 WHERE ARE STATES TODAY?, supra note 42. 
 191 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(i) (West 2012). 
 192 Galewitz, supra note 22. 
 193 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(a).  
 194 Kreier & Zweifel, supra note 24, at 97. 
 195 See Donahue, supra note 24, at 424–25.  In a voluntary insurance system, insurance 
companies are forced to adjust their ratings based on purchasers’ characteristics, as charging 
everyone the same rate would cause comparatively healthy people not to participate.  Only 
through a compulsory system, wherein insurance companies can rely on consistent enrollment 
across race, gender, and health lines, can these companies curtail this process of premium 
rating.  Id.   
 196 TANNER, supra note 2, at 25. 
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premiums online, perhaps contributing to the Swiss public’s high level of 
compliance with the country’s individual mandate.197 
Along with, and perhaps due to, its near-universal insurance coverage, 
Switzerland’s delivery of health care itself is fairly equitable.  A recent study 
found no statistically significant income-based differences in the distribution 
of health care in Switzerland, as measured by average general physician 
visits.198 This compares favorably with the pro-rich distribution in the 
U.S.,199 and even ranks ahead200 of the heavily government-funded Canadian 
health care system.201  Further, as mentioned above, Switzerland avoids the 
unwieldy access hurdle of waiting times for procedures that exists in many 
other universal health care systems.202  
Thus, while Switzerland’s system of partially subsidized private 
insurance has achieved some of its egalitarian aims,203 the question of cost 
remains.  It is less clear whether Switzerland’s insurance exchanges have 
significantly reduced health care costs in the aggregate.204  One can intuit that 
approaches, such as income-based subsidies, community rating, and 
guaranteed issue, have made health care more affordable for some who 
would otherwise struggle with costs.205  Yet, as previously discussed, 
aggregate health care costs in Switzerland remain among the highest in the 
world.206  
This Note offers three reasons why high costs should not sound the death 
knell for the Swiss methodology as applied to the U.S. First, the low 
proportion of government expenditures comprising Switzerland’s overall 
health care costs is a virtue worth repeating,207 especially in this Note’s 
particular context.  As discussed, much of the opposition to the PPACA 
relates to the normative role of government, and objections to the Medicaid 
expansion have manifested a swelling tide in opposition of higher 
government spending toward health care.208  While administration of 
                                                                                                                   
 197 For an example of a popular website used to compare Swiss insurance plans, see 
COMPARIS, http://en.comparis.ch/comparis.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
 198 LEU & SCHELLHORN, supra note 128, at 13. 
 199 Id. at 17.  
 200 DE LOOPER, supra note 32, at 151 tbl.6.5.1.  
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 202 Id. at 24, 27, 32.  
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exchanges will inevitably yield certain costs to the states,209 Switzerland has 
shown that such a system relies less on the government than other 
alternatives.  The second mitigating factor to Switzerland’s high costs is the 
low rate at which those costs have been rising.  From 1997 to 2007, 
Switzerland’s health care costs only grew at an annual rate of 2.3%, the 
second-slowest rate among OECD countries during that span.210  Third, this 
Note posits that anyone considering health care reform in the U.S. must 
acknowledge the impossibility of a single panacea rectifying the current 
system’s myriad cost and access issues.  While the Swiss model has 
produced high health care costs, those costs are still substantially lower than 
those of the U.S. and rising at a slower rate.211  Any system that stabilizes or 
lowers the growth rate of health care costs, while extending access to many 
whom the pre-PPACA system failed to account for, can hardly be 
characterized as a poor model for the U.S.  
D.  Possible Problems with the Insurance Exchanges and How They Can be 
Avoided 
As stated in the previous section, this Note does not suggest that the 
PPACA’s insurance exchanges will serve as a cure-all, but rather endorses 
them as a palatable solution to existing access and cost problems, particularly 
as an alternative to the Medicaid expansion.  Indeed, the study of 
Switzerland’s experience with such exchanges reveals problems that may 
arise in administrating the U.S. exchanges.  Perhaps the two most glaring 
problems that may surface in the U.S. are high out-of-pocket expenses and 
noncompliance by the purchasing public.  
Switzerland’s high out-of-pocket expenses212 may reasonably give pause 
to anyone considering partially subsidized insurance exchanges as a blessing 
to low-income populations.  However, high out-of-pocket costs are not 
necessarily at odds with a health care system that serves lower and middle 
classes.  The PPACA accounts for this issue, in part, by eliminating cost-
                                                                                                                   
 209 Though administrative costs are still speculative and will vary from state to state, most 
states intend to cover much of the exchanges’ costs through 2% to 4% surcharges on insurance 
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 212 DE LOOPER, supra note 32, at 147, tbl.6.3.1.  At 5.9% of each household’s total 
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sharing for certain preventive services.213  That is, those participating in 
Medicare or Medicaid, or purchasing QHPs via an insurance exchange, will 
be able to obtain essential preventive care without any out-of-pocket 
payments.  The PPACA also puts general caps on cost-sharing for enrollees 
in an insurance exchange, putting more substantial limitations on out-of-
pocket expenses of those closer to the poverty level.214  Whether these 
provisions will sufficiently mitigate the issue of out-of-pocket burdens on 
U.S. consumers remains to be seen, but the law certainly does not leave the 
problem unaddressed.  A campaign to encourage preventive care that is free 
of cost-sharing, may help to spare patients high out-of-pocket expenses 
attached to emergency care, as well as contribute to overall wellness.  
Another possible threat to the success of the PPACA’s insurance 
exchanges is excessive noncompliance with the law’s individual mandate.  
Some speculate that the cost of the mandate’s penalty relative to a basic 
insurance plan,215 or the U.S.’s history of disobedience to legal mandates,216 
will lead to widespread nonparticipation in the purchasing market and a 
return to the status quo. Proponents of the second theory have pointed to the 
Switzerland’s near-universal compliance with its automobile insurance 
mandate, compared to only 83% of U.S. drivers who comply with a similar 
mandate.217  Yet the decision to purchase health insurance should be 
distinguished from the decision to purchase car insurance insofar as 
individuals are not certain to be in a car accident during their lifetimes, 
whereas conventional wisdom dictates that everyone will at some point 
encounter health care needs.  Thus, the health insurance mandate might exert 
a greater gravitational force on consumers than that exerted by car insurance 
mandates.  However, even if we assume Americans will be motivated to 
participate, we still must consider the cost dilemma: does the penalty for 
abstinence lack the teeth required to induce participation in the insurance 
exchanges?  
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The penalty for noncompliance is not negligible and may, in fact, exceed 
the cost of a basic health plan.218  For example, a purchaser under 133% of 
the poverty level will not be required to pay more than 2% of his income on 
insurance through the exchanges, but would pay at least a penalty of 2.5% of 
his income, and likely a greater flat rate, for noncompliance.219  Conversely, 
it is possible that those with lower government subsidies would be required 
to pay more for an insurance plan than the corresponding penalty alone.220  
To correct for this disincentive, it is crucial that the government educate the 
public as to the additional costs associated with the failure to purchase health 
insurance.  Health insurance, while perhaps costly in the short term, can be a 
source of significant savings if health needs develop for the consumer.  An 
educational campaign by federal or state government can help remedy the 
issue of nonparticipation based on perceived cost savings.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The U.S. health care system preceding the PPACA was a mire of porous 
coverage and exorbitant costs.  Many among the lower and middle classes 
did not have sufficient access to health insurance, and thus to adequate health 
care.  In seeking care, these populations suffered directly from exponentially 
increasing costs of services, products, and insurance premiums.  The 
resulting number of uninsured patients in the U.S. led to a cost spiral in 
which those unable to pay for care received uncompensated emergency care, 
shifting costs to society at large.  
The PPACA sought to remedy this and other U.S. health care ailments by 
extending coverage to everyone, using the combination of an individual 
mandate, partly subsidized insurance exchanges, and an expansion of 
Medicaid.  However, when the Supreme Court ruled that states could not be 
forced to comply with the Medicaid expansion, the concern resurfaced that 
certain lower- and middle-class groups would fall through the cracks of the 
insurance system. 
States that have declined to expand their Medicaid programs must 
somehow account for those populations if they want any improvement from 
the status quo.  These states should look to Switzerland, which has no 
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welfare system such as Medicaid, but still manages to insure nearly 100% of 
its population.  
Switzerland uses government-run exchanges of private health insurance 
to provide basic coverage to all of its citizens, and subsidizes certain plans 
based on purchasers’ incomes.  This system has led to high-quality health 
care, distributed more equitably than that of the U.S.  
The PPACA calls for almost identical insurance exchanges, and states 
would be prudent to embrace them.  The exchanges, customizable by each 
state if the state chooses, are a pro-market rebuttal to Medicaid’s 
egalitarianism, but can be quite egalitarian in their own right.  Through 
competition among eligible insurers, transparency of pricing, regulation of 
rating practices, and income-based subsidies, the PPACA’s insurance 
exchanges promise to extend access where it is most needed.  U.S. states that 
choose to decline the Medicaid expansion should use these exchanges to fill 
their coverage gaps, as solidarity should not be a goal exclusive to 
Switzerland. 
